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RECENT DECISIONS
should be moulded to accomplish equitable results. The court there-
fore held that an equitable result would be brought about if the policy
were regarded as reinstated, any necessary adjustments being made
with respect to premiums and dividends, and if the surrender value
were credited to the company as of the date the company paid it
to the insured. Plaintiff then would recover the balance of the total
value of the insurance.
B. H. A.
NEGLIGENCE-CHILDREN UNDER DISABILITY-INFANT THREE
YEARS AND Two MONTHS OLD CONCLUSIVELY PRESUMED INCAPABLE
OF NEGLIGENCE.-Defendant, approaching an intersection while driv-
ing along in his automobile, struck the plaintiff's son who darted out
from between two parked cars into the path of defendant's automo-
bile. The child died that same day. At the trial, evidence was
introduced showing the deceased to have been brighter and more
mentally alert than the normal child of his age. The court submitted
to the jury the question of defendant's negligence while driving the
automobile which struck the child, and also an issue as to the con-
tributory negligence of the deceased, who was an infant of three years
and two months at the time of the accident. Plaintiff's counsel re-
quested a charge that "a child of the age of three years and two months
is non sui juris and incapable of being guilty of negligence." The
request was refused and the jury brought in a verdict for the defen-
dant. The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court's verdict ' and
plaintiff appeals by permission to the Court of Appeals. Held, re-
versed and a new trial granted. A child of the age of three years
and two months is non sui juris and incapable of being guilty of negli-
gence. Verni v. Johnson, 295 N. Y. 436, 68 N. E. (2d) 431 (1946).
At what age a child is presumed to be incapable of contributory
negligence has long divided the courts. 2 In the United States, the
weight of authority, as regards a child between three years and four
years of age is in favor of a conclusive presumption of incapacity.3
However, many courts hold that age alone does not determine whether
a child is sui juris but that experience, maturity, and intelligence also
enter into the picture and it is a question for the jury to decide.4 It
1269 App. Div. 997, 58 N. Y. S. (2d) 382 (2d Dep't 1945).
2 "The law does not disregard variations in capacity among children of
the same age, and does not arbitrarily fix an age at which the duty to exercise
some care begins or an age at which an infant must exercise the same care as
an adult." Camardo v. New York State Ry., 247 N. Y. 111, 116, 159 N. E.
879, 880 (1928).
3 Note (1937) 107 A. L. R. 4, 100.4 Leach v. St. Louis-San Francisco R. R., 48 F. (2d) 722 (C. C. A. 6th,
1931) (experience, mental capacity and particular circumstances of case);
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must be remembered that the degree of care required by an infant of
tender years is not to be confused with that required by an adult, but
is to be measured by the maturity and capacity of the individual. 5
The conduct of a child of tender years is judged by the standard of
behavior one would expect from a child of like age, intelligence, and
experience. 6
But if the care required of a child is to be measured by such
considerations as its maturity, capacity, discretion, and knowledge,
there must, of course, be an age at which no care can be required of
a child, an age at which the doctrine of contributory negligence can
have no application. In Jacobs v. Koehler Sporting Goods Co., 7 the
court held that an infant may be of such tender years as to be in-
capable of personal negligence and at such age the infant is termed
non sid juris. In the case of very young children, one or two years
old, the question seldom arises, but as we progress above those ages,
there are so many conflicting decisions as to make futile any attempt
to set the age of which it can be said that the conclusive presumption
of incapacity ceases.
D.L.
PARENT AND CHILD-PARENT'S LIABILITY FOR LEGAL SERVICES
FURNISHED THE CHILD-RIGHT OF CLIENT TO DISCHARGE AT-
TORNEY.-Defendant's seventeen year old daughter was indicted on
criminal charges. Defendant retained an attorney to defend his
daughter. There was some evidence to indicate that the attorney
hired by the defendant did not take all necessary precautions for
the protection of his client. The daughter, prior to the termination
of the criminal proceedings against her, discharged the attorney se-
cured by the defendant and retained counsel of her own choice. This
second attorney is the plaintiff in this action. The plaintiff predi-
cates his action for the recovery of the value of his professional ser-
vices upon an implied promise on the part of the defendant to pay
for necessaries furnished to his infant daughter. At the close of a
jury trial the Municipal Court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint on
its merits, holding that as a matter of law the defendant had fur-
Marfyak v. New England Transportation Co., 120 Conn. 46, 179 Ati. 9 (1935)(age, experience and judgment) ; Lesage v. Largey Lumber Co., 99 Mont. 372,
43 P. (2d) 896 (1935) (experience, intelligence and capability); Davis v.
Bailey, 162 Okla. 86, 19 P. (2d) 147 (1933) (intelligence, experience, discre-
tion, previous training, maturity, alertness, and nature of danger encountered) ;
Camardo v. New York State Ry., 247 N. Y. 111, 159 N. E. 879 (1928) (age
and capacity); see PRossER o1m TORTS (1941) §36, HARPER, THaE LAW OF
ToRTs (1933) § 141.
5 Finkelstein v. N. Y. C. and H. R. R. R., 41 Hun 34, 40 (1886).
6 REsTATEmENT, ToRTs § 283.
7208 N. Y. 416, 102 N. E. 519 (1913).
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